Quantifier Variance and Realism : Oxford University Press : 9780199732111 : 0199732116 : 26 May 2011 : The essays in this volume present a distinctive metaontological perspective that combines two ideas: first, that objects in the world exist for the most part in complete independence of language or thought; but, second, that the world can in principle be correctly and adequately described without employing our ordinary concept of "the objects that exist in the world" Although these ideas are often thought to be in conflict, Hirsch argues that they are seen to be perfectly compatible when one has a clear understanding of what is and what is not implied by the possibility of varying the meanings of our quantifier expressions In the resulting metaontological perspective the mind-dependence of objects is not implied. What is implied, however, is that many ontological disputes are merely verbal, each ontological position employing a different concept of "the objects that exist in the worl